Claude Sonnet 5.5 系统卡披露安全评估与自主性风险判定

refusals (whether the model declines to engage with the request). We report results on both the core model without a system prompt and on claude.ai with the default system prompt applied. The claude.ai system prompt includes our standard language directing Claude to engage even-handedly across viewpoints; reporting both configurations shows the model’s baseline behavior alongside its behavior as consumer users on claude.ai will encounter it. 41 [Figure 4.4.1.A] Pairwise political bias [...] Claude Sonnet 5.5 with the same safeguards we have deployed for Opus 5, rather than the broader dual use research biology classifiers used for Opus 5.5. 19 2.3 AI R&D 2.3.1 Autonomy evaluations Our autonomy assessments are motivated by two key threat models from our RSP: ●​ Autonomy threat model 1: misaligned AI systems in high-stakes settings. This threat model concerns AI systems that are highly relied upon and have extensive access to sensitive assets, as well as moderate capacity for [...] teams of human researchers in domains where fast progress could cause threats to international security and/or rapid disruptions to the global balance of power. Examples of such domains include energy, robotics, weapons development, and AI itself. 2.3.1.1 How Claude Sonnet 5.5 affects or changes analysis from our most recent Risk Report Our current determination is that: ●​ Autonomy threat model 1 is applicable to Claude Sonnet 5.5, as it is to many of our previous AI models. We discuss in