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Claroc 报告:94.7% 的 Grok 生成应用可无需登录访问,含 SpaceXSI 内部销售数据

原标题:Grok-built apps exposed patient data, plaintext passwords, and SpaceXSI's own sales pipeline

安全公司 Claroc 报告称,检查的 37,571 个 Grok 生成应用中 94.7%(35,578 个)无需登录即可访问,暴露内容包括 ICU 患者化验值、3,500 余名员工名单、18 组明文密码,以及 SpaceXSI 和 X 员工发布的 24 个内部应用(含 594 个战略客户销售地图和机密广告提案)。Claroc 将原因归结为发布时默认预选“任何有链接的人”以及子域名可被被动 DNS 数据库检索,SpaceXSI 已下线员工应用但未处理其他用户的开放应用,Claroc 正在直接通知受影响方。

为什么值得看

原文给出了暴露比例、成因和与 ChatGPT 默认设置的对比,读者可据此评估 AI 生成应用共享机制的风险。

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原文

Apps built with the AI assistant Grok are almost always open to anyone with the link, according to a security firm. The exposed data includes patient records and confidential documents from Grok maker SpaceXSI itself.

Security firm Claroc found more than 35,000 Grok-built apps that could be accessed without login, according to a recent report. In SpaceXSI's "Build" mode (the company was formerly xAI), users describe an app in a chat and Grok writes the code. An app only goes public when its creator clicks "Publish," which gives it its own address on grok.me.

Out of 37,571 apps Claroc checked that were still online, 35,578 were open to anyone. That's 94.7 percent, according to the report. Claroc points to the publish dialog as the cause. On the paid account the firm used for testing, "Anyone with the link" was already preselected. The addresses were also easy to find. Each app gets its own subdomain, so its name shows up in commercial passive DNS databases after the first visit. Those databases can be searched by pattern.

Six-step diagram showing how an app published with the "Anyone with the link" default gets its own grok.me subdomain, appears in passive DNS data, and can be accessed by strangers without an account.

Each published app gets its own subdomain, which lands in searchable passive DNS databases after the first visit. | Image: Claroc

SpaceXSI employees exposed internal documents too

24 of the accessible apps came from SpaceXSI and X employees. Among them was a confidential onboarding plan for a new enterprise sales team member that included internal system addresses and 19 chat channels. Claroc also found a publicly accessible sales territory map with 594 strategic accounts and pipeline data, plus eight X ad proposals. One of those proposals targeted a U.S. federal agency and was marked as confidential. Campaign reports and dashboards with ad spending were also exposed.

Dashboard titled "North Central Territory Mapper" from xAI Grok Enterprise Sales showing 594 strategic accounts across six territories in the U.S. Midwest, with company names redacted.

The sales territory map assigns 594 strategic accounts to six territories and ranks them by priority. | Image: Claroc

Most of the open apps were games, landing pages, or calculators, Claroc says. But about one in ten contained sensitive material, internal business data, or personal information. The firm classifies roughly two percent as especially bad. The researchers estimate that 650 to 800 apps contained private data.

Confirmed cases included an ICU briefing with a patient's lab values, a list of more than 3,500 employees at a hospital group, and a fire department shift schedule. The source code of a timesheet app contained 18 accounts with plaintext passwords. Beyond SpaceXSI and X, Claroc identified 30 affected organizations, six of them Fortune 500 companies. The firm is withholding the names.

Excerpt from the script of a timesheet app showing account entries with ID, name, password, and password hash fields, all values redacted.

The script of a Grok-built timesheet app contained 18 accounts with plaintext passwords. | Image: Claroc

Grok test app let an outside account join the team

Two of Claroc's own test apps turned up another problem. A contact list app ended up with a database that had no login, so anonymous visitors could add entries. For a sales team customer list, Grok added Google and X sign-in on its own. In that test app, though, Grok's code added every authenticated user to the team first and only checked membership afterward. An outside Google account could then read, edit, and delete records. Claroc says it ran write and delete tests only on its own apps.

Six-step diagram showing how a stranger signs in with Google or X, gets added to the team by the app first, and then passes the team membership check.

In Claroc's test app, the Grok-written code first added every authenticated visitor to the team and only checked membership afterward. | Image: Claroc

Grok does offer the right settings. When set to "Only you," the test app blocked outside access. It just isn't the default. In a test with ChatGPT, a newly built app defaulted to "Only me" when shared. That app's address can also show up in DNS data, but it leads to an app only the owner can open.

SpaceXSI says publishing takes several steps

SpaceXSI responded to the disclosure only by saying that apps are private until their creator shares them, that publishing takes multiple steps including a legal notice, and that employee accounts default to "Only you." Claroc counters that extra clicks don't help if "Anyone with the link" is still preselected at the final step. The 24 open employee apps also show how little the stricter default for staff accounts actually helps, the firm says.

Claroc proposed that SpaceXSI make "Only you" the default and show who will have access before publishing. Grok should also warn when an app has a database but no login. Instead of individual subdomains, apps should run on hard-to-guess paths on a shared host so their names don't end up in DNS data.

SpaceXSI has since taken the 24 employee apps offline but hasn't removed the open apps from other Grok users and organizations. Claroc offered to share the full list of addresses confidentially. Because SpaceXSI didn't commit to contacting the affected owners, Claroc is now notifying them directly. The firm has its own interests here. It sells security solutions for AI-built apps.

This is at least the third privacy incident for SpaceXSI involving Grok. In August 2025, Forbes found more than 370,000 shared Grok conversations in Google Search. In July 2026, the terminal tool Grok Build uploaded user files to the company's servers without asking, including SSH keys and password databases. Because of sexualized deepfakes generated by Grok, Ireland's data protection authority is also investigating whether X neglected data protection by design.

Other providers have similar problems with their sharing features. Using the same passive DNS method, Claroc tracked down about 6,800 shared conversations from Meta's agent Muse in October. At Anthropic, shared Claude chats and artifacts turned up in search engines in July, including user-built apps.

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事件综述

Grok Build 分享链接可枚举,数万应用数据泄露,含 SpaceXSI 内部数据

2026 年 11 月 10 日,Ars Technica 报道安全公司 Claroc 的研究发现,xAI 旗下 vibe-coding 编程智能体 Grok Build 的应用分享链接可被枚举,导致数千用户项目数据泄露,内容包括商业计划、广告提案、体检结果以及员工姓名和工号。泄露原因是分享链接虽经随机化,但一项设计决定使任何人都能枚举在线项目并查看其中全部数据。其中 24 个泄露应用由 SpaceXSI(SpaceX 与 xAI 合并后的实体)自行构建,包括标注机密的销售团队入职计划、覆盖 594 个客户的销售区域图和内部系统地址。后续报道称……The Decoder 于 11 月 11 日援引 Claroc 报告补充:在检查的 37,571 个 Grok 生成应用中,94.7%(35,578 个)无需登录即可访问,暴露内容还包括 ICU 患者化验值、3,500 余名员工名单和 18 组明文密码;泄露原因被归结为发布时默认预选“任何有链接的人”,且相关子域名可被被动 DNS 数据库检索。Claroc 表示 SpaceXSI 已下线其员工应用,但其他用户的开放应用未被处理,Claroc 正在直接通知受影响方。报道 1 称 Grok Build 属于 xAI,报道 2 称其属于合并后的 SpaceXSI 旗下,未确认归属变化的具体时间。

其他来源的报道 1