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黄仁勋辞任 Nvidia CEO:Decoder 访谈解析中国想从他身上得到什么

原标题:Jensen Huang is out. What did China want from him?

黄仁勋因绯闻及涉嫌中国间谍的丑闻辞任 Nvidia CEO,The Verge 的 Decoder 节目发布紧急访谈。主持人 Nilay Patel 与布鲁金斯学会 John L. Thornton 中国中心研究员 Kyle Chan 探讨此案:美国情报界指称 Megaspeed 高管 Alice Huang 可能为中方情报人员,而 Megaspeed 是 Nvidia 客户,可能在马来西亚建数据中心并成为中国 AI 公司获取 Blackwell 等芯片的渠道。Chan 认为,中国的最大潜在收益是借黄仁勋与 Trump 的密切关系影响美国出口管制政策;他还分析了中国聚焦开源模型扩散而非追逐 AGI 的策略、华为等国产芯片供应链建设、以及可能的稀土出口管制反制,并指出国会调查和股东诉讼可能对 Nvidia 和整个美国 AI 生态造成冲击。

为什么值得看

访谈从美方和中方两个视角拆解了此事对出口管制博弈和 AI 生态的可能影响,背景脉络清晰。

阅读原文 ↗11月13日 AI 日报

本页的摘要、推荐理由与解读出自 AIsa Studio 的 AI 风向智能体,原文版权归原作者所有。

深度解读

发生了什么

The Verge 的 Decoder 节目发布了一期访谈,围绕 Nvidia CEO 黄仁勋突然辞职的事件展开。主持人 Nilay Patel 在节目开头说明,事件发酵速度极快,以致于他们在发布前几分钟紧急改写了开场白——黄仁勋因包括与一名「据称的中国间谍」的婚外情在内的丑闻而辞任 CEO,Nvidia 此后的重组方式尚待观察。就在两天前,Patel 采访了布鲁金斯学会 John L. Thornton 中国中心的政策研究员 Kyle Chan,核心问题是:中国到底想从黄仁勋身上得到什么?

关键细节

  • 丑闻的中心人物是 Alice Huang 与其所在的公司 Megaspeed。据访谈转述,美国情报界认为她可能是中国情报部门的「资产」;Megaspeed 是 Nvidia 的客户,在马来西亚建有数据中心,可能与中国公司有联系,或成为中国 AI 公司获取 Blackwell 等尖端芯片的渠道。Chan 强调「我们必须分清知道什么、不知道什么」,很多细节是模糊的,而且「模糊可能是有原因的」。
  • 关于中国为何要接近黄仁勋,Chan 的判断很直接:如果是为了芯片设计参数,该找的是技术团队,而非这位有约 60 名直接下属、四处发表政策演讲的 CEO。真正的价值可能是「了解美国的政策制定过程」——黄仁勋与特朗普关系密切,特朗普随时可以打他手机。更大的担忧是方向反过来:中国可能通过黄仁勋影响美国在出口管制上的决策,这是华盛顿许多人的最大顾虑。
  • 中国在芯片上的处境:中国 AI 公司长期深度依赖 Nvidia 芯片,是 CUDA 生态最大的贡献者之一;但出口管制推动它们转向华为等国产芯片,目标是建立一条「足够好、能抵御华盛顿政策冲击」的平行供应链。访谈还提到商务部曾审查 Megaspeed 数月,Nvidia 总法律顾问 Tim Teter 致信商务部副部长 Jeff Kessler 后案件移交司法部,随后停滞。

为什么重要

Chan 认为这场风波可能改变出口管制辩论的力量对比。主张放宽管制、扩大出口的一方——商务部长 Lutnick、黄仁勋和特朗普本人——其论点可能因丑闻而被「污染」;对华鹰派会赢得更多回合。他甚至提出一个反直觉判断:中国可能「搬起石头砸自己的脚」,因为「他们污染了那位最主张放宽出口管制的人」。另外,黄仁勋不只是技术领袖,更是「做市商」:他表态能让初创公司和 neocloud 股价上涨;他也是 AGI 狂热论和闭源路线最重要的制衡者与开源倡导者,他离场会留下真空。Nvidia 若芯片节奏放缓,可能波及整个美国 AI 生态。

对谁有影响

  • Nvidia:面临已提起的股东诉讼和日益高涨的国会调查呼声,Chan 建议公司配合调查、尽早「坦白」。
  • 美国 AI 产业:从依赖芯片的实验室到靠黄仁勋背书的云初创公司,都在这个以他为圆心的网络图上。
  • 中美双方:中国一边推动国产替代,一边可能用稀土等出口管制反制;而中国 AI 公司「仍然想要 Nvidia 芯片」,与政府路线存在分歧。
全文翻译

以下翻译只覆盖原文的前一部分,其余内容请看下方原文。

今天,我们要讨论的是英伟达(Nvidia)创始人兼首席执行官黄仁勋的丑闻。由于事态发展迅速,我们在发布本期节目前几分钟才紧急更新了这段开场白。

随着黄仁勋婚外情消息(包括与一名据称是中国间谍的女子)可能将公司卷入漩涡的报道出现,他刚刚辞去了英伟达首席执行官一职。

随着事态发展和我们了解到英伟达将在黄仁勋离开后如何重组自身——毕竟他曾有大约60名直接下属,而且整个AI金融生态都流经这家公司——我们将对此故事进行更多报道。这完全是《Decoder》节目的素材。

但就在两天前,我与布鲁金斯学会约翰·L·桑顿中国中心的对外政策研究员陈凯尔(Kyle Chan)进行了交谈,探讨这场丑闻的核心实质:中国通过让一名间谍如此接近黄仁勋究竟想达成什么目的?从中国的角度来看,美中AI冲突的真实状况究竟如何?

陈凯尔关于芯片以及中国如何看待所谓AI“竞赛”的回答非常具有启发性,但也许更有趣的是他对黄仁勋与特朗普关系的观察——因为中国最有可能获得的收益,或许是一个能在关键人物耳边低语的人。

让我们直接进入正题。但要记住,在我们交谈时,我们还不知道黄仁勋会发生什么。

好了:听听陈凯尔关于英伟达、中国和AI出口管制未来的看法。我们开始吧。

本次访谈经过轻微编辑,以精简篇幅并提高清晰度。

陈凯尔,你是布鲁金斯学会约翰·L·桑顿中国中心的研究员。欢迎来到 Decoder****。

很高兴来到这里。

就你在中国方面的专业知识而言,我们今天到底在谈论什么?我有许多问题要问你,关于英伟达,关于我们作为一个国家、一个经济体与中国的关系,以及国家安全。

让我们从头开始。根据我们目前掌握的所有报道,美国政府似乎非常担心一家名为Megaspeed的公司,以及处于围绕英伟达CEO黄仁勋的混乱丑闻中心的据称是中国间谍的黄爱丽丝(Alice Huang)。关于黄爱丽丝和Megaspeed,我们知道些什么?

我们必须谨慎区分我们所知与未知。迄今为止,有指控称美国情报界认为黄爱丽丝可能是中国情报部门的资产。Megaspeed本身是英伟达的客户,他们在马来西亚建造了一个数据中心。

他们似乎还可能与中国公司有联系,并且——这里我们就进入了已知与未知的领域——可能成为中国AI公司获取英伟达最新芯片(如Blackwell系列)的渠道。

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我想把时间倒回很久以前。中国AI行业渴望获得英伟达芯片的说法已经流传多年,而由于无法获得英伟达芯片的限制,中国AI行业会开发出平行或更优越的技术体系的想法也在话语中多次浮现。

我特别想到的是DeepSeek。DeepSeek 推出了R1,在某些方面超越了我们的模型。我们认为他们没有获得芯片的访问权限。有一些指控说他们获得了芯片访问权限。事实证明,他们对已有的芯片进行了一系列微调。

这种关系是怎样的?他们需要最高端的英伟达芯片吗?他们确实在开发可能优于他们所能获得的芯片的平行技术,这是真的吗?请先铺垫一下背景。

许多细节都很模糊,而且它们之所以模糊可能有其原因。但到目前为止,我们看到的中国AI公司非常依赖英伟达芯片来训练和运行其模型。事实上,他们成为了CUDA生态系统(英伟达的软件生态系统和平台)的主要贡献者之一。

他们在这方面做得非常出色,但同时,随着美国出口管制和对获取尖端GPU访问权的技术限制日益严格,中国越来越推动这些AI公司从英伟达转向华为和其他国内AI芯片制造商。其想法是建立一个足够好的平行国内AI芯片供应链,即使不能与英伟达的最新芯片相媲美,至少也要——至关重要地——能够抵御来自华盛顿的政策行动。

所以,这就是截至目前的故事。问题是,现在中国GPU或AI芯片发展的轨迹是什么?

我想从这里开始的原因是,接近黄仁勋的动机对我来说非常模糊。作为英伟达的CEO,我理解每个人都觉得他是那个角色,实际上他在设计下一代英伟达GPU的软件,但他只是环游世界发表政策演讲。

如果你想构建一个平行的GPU生态系统,你试图接近设计师和工程师,对吧?那么试图接近黄仁勋的目标会是什么?

如果你想要最新英伟达GPU的设计规格,我不知道你会不会直接问黄仁勋。我认为你可能会去找他的技术团队。

他确实有大约60名直接下属。 Decoder 经常是一档关于组织架构图的节目,而这个一直在我列表的顶端,但我们先把它放在一边。继续讲。

这实际上可能涉及两件事。一是试图了解,也许是获取有关美国决策过程的信息。黄仁勋与特朗普关系密切。他们经常交谈。特朗普显然可以随时在他的手机上给黄仁勋打电话。

在一次会议中间。我们已经看过那段视频了。

另一方面,也许这是一个更大的问题,甚至可能是最大的担忧,是担心运动的方向可能会反过来,即通过黄仁勋,中国可能能够影响美国的政策制定,特别是关于出口管制。这是华盛顿许多人的一大担忧。

这里的另一个潜在担忧,我只是想梳理清楚,就是黄爱丽丝,这名据称是中国间谍的女子,是一家名为Megaspeed的公司的高管。通过Megaspeed,英伟达可能已经规避了出口管制。 既然你们已经在解决这个问题了,也许你们应该就此罢手。这种动态是如何展开的?

这个故事有很多奇怪之处。即使以最愤世嫉俗的角度来看,这也说不通。可能有几种不同的可能性。一种情况是,这实际上并非北京方面试图获取芯片、信息或影响力的协同策略,而是北京方面可能没有完全理解局势的全貌,并希望策反这位黄爱丽丝女士,并至少尝试从她的角度了解正在发生的事情。

因为我认为你说得对。英伟达与Megaspeed之间已经存在非常紧密的关系。同时,在影响力方面,黄仁勋一直在为其自身的商业利益游说,主张放宽对其芯片对华出口的管制。你其实不需要北京方面去踩那个油门。这种情况已经在发生了。

所以,如果你从那些立场来思考,有些事情并不完全合理;但如果你从“北京希望获得可见度”的角度来思考,那么这可能是另一种合理的解释。

北京只是希望有一个特朗普会打电话的人来为他们的观点代言。我看到了所有这些,但我们从中得到了什么?如果目标是英伟达芯片,感觉那已经是板上钉钉的事。如果目标是英伟达的工程计划,那还是个问号。如果目标是对特朗普政府施加影响,我觉得他们可以直接购买加密货币。

[笑声] 没错。

这里有一大团迷雾,关于实际发生了什么。也许你的观点是,北京只需要更多的可见度,因为这是一团迷雾,这才是动机。由此引出的问题是,《纽约时报》报道说,美国情报机构一年前就已向特朗普政府标记了这些问题。有一份来自马尔科·鲁比奥(Marco Rubio)的备忘录。报道称他监督了这份备忘录,这在某种程度上是一种合理的否认手段。他监督了它。他知道有这份备忘录。一年前,美国的国家安全机器就已经担心Megaspeed的黄爱丽丝、她与黄仁勋的关系,但什么也没发生。你怎么看这件事?

这是所有这一切中最令人担忧的方面之一。无论细节如何,无论公众所知与我们情报界所知有何不同,这都是需要调查的事情。这显然是一个重大的国家安全问题,你不希望有人在这个过程中捣乱。你需要进行全面调查,查明真相。

我认为我们从一些报道中看到的情况是,此事早已为人所知,事实上,如果有过什么努力,可能是试图阻止这项调查或以某种方式扭曲它。从美国政府的内部视角来看,这非常令人不安。

在这个故事的这一部分,英伟达发生了很多事情,其中英伟达自己的发言人公开对多家出版物表示:“这里没什么事发生。这是一段正常的关系。”一周后,黄仁勋发表道歉信,承认存在一段关系。 这对英伟达的公关人员约翰·里佐(John Rizzo)来说可不是好事。英伟达总法律顾问蒂姆·特特(Tim Teter)在外面声称一切都在正轨上。现在我们才知道并非一切都在正轨上。你怎么看待英伟达的企业治理?因为随之而来的将是大量的股东诉讼。今天已经提交了一份。我只能想象还会有更多。

英伟达必须非常小心地处理此事,因为你不想看到的正是已经发生的事情,即开始否认或轻视某些问题,然后转身不得不承认:“实际上,那里可能确实有问题。”

这一点现在尤为重要,因为要求国会进行调查的声音越来越大。因此,这可能独立于行政分支之外,在那里,同样,我认为我们有理由担心利益冲突以及人们不愿彻底调查此事。但如果进行全面的国会调查,可能会揭示一些事情,如果你是英伟达,你希望提前揭露这些情况,而不是稍后不得不退缩并为自己辩解。

政府对于黄爱丽丝和Megaspeed的担忧与此来回拉扯的一部分是,商务部

查看原文

Today, we’re talking about the Jensen Huang scandal at Nvidia, which is developing so quickly that we had to do an emergency update of this intro minutes before publishing this episode.

Huang just resigned from his position as CEO of Nvidia as news of his affairs, including with an alleged Chinese spy, threatened to engulf the company.

We’ll have more on that story as things develop and we learn how Nvidia will restructure itself after Jensen — he had something like 60 direct reports, after all, and the entire AI financial ecosystem flows through the company. This is pure Decoder bait.

But just two days ago I talked to Kyle Chan, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution’s John L. Thornton China Center, about the real heart of the scandal: What would China even seek to accomplish by having a spy so close to Jensen? And what does the real state of the US-China AI conflict really looks like, particularly from the Chinese point of view?

Kyle’s answers about chips and how China is perceiving the so-called AI “race” were very illuminating, but maybe even more interesting was his observation on Jensen Huang’s relationship with Trump was the most important thing of all — because maybe what China most stood to gain was someone who could whisper in the right ears.

Let’s just dive right into it. But keep in mind that when we were talking, we still didn’t know what would happen with Jensen.

Okay: Kyle Chan on Nvidia, China, and the future of AI export controls. Here we go.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

Kyle Chan, you are a fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Welcome to Decoder****.

Great to be here.

What on earth could we be talking about as it relates to your expertise about China today? I have a lot to ask you about Nvidia, about our relationship to China as a country, as an economy, and about national security.

Let’s start at the very beginning. From all the reporting we have today, it seems like the United States government has been very worried about a company called Megaspeed and Alice Huang, the alleged Chinese spy at the center of the swirling scandal around Jensen Huang, the CEO of Nvidia. What do we know about Alice Huang and Megaspeed?

We have to be careful about what we know and what we don’t know. So far, there are allegations that the US intelligence community believes that Alice Huang may be an asset of the Chinese intelligence services. Megaspeed itself is a customer of Nvidia’s and they built a data center in Malaysia.

They also seem to potentially have ties with Chinese companies and could — and this is where we’re getting into what we do know and what we don’t know — potentially be a conduit for Chinese AI companies accessing cutting-edge Nvidia chips like Blackwells.

Verge subscribers, don’t forget you get exclusive access to ad-free Decoder wherever you get your podcasts. Head here. Not a subscriber? You can sign up here.

I want to rewind way back. The notion that the Chinese AI industry wants Nvidia chips has been floating around for years and the idea that the Chinese AI industry would somehow develop a parallel set of technology or a superior set of technology because of the constraint of not having Nvidia chips has percolated into the discourse several times.

I’m particularly thinking about DeepSeek. DeepSeek launched R1 and it outperformed our models in some ways. We think they didn’t have access to the chips. There are some accusations that they had access to the chips. It turns out they did a bunch of fine-tuning on the chips they did have.

What is that relationship like? Do they need the highest-end Nvidia chips? Is it true that they’re actually developing parallel technologies that might be superior to the chips they can have? Just set that stage.

A lot of the details are murky, and they’re probably murky for a reason. But up until now, we saw Chinese AI companies that were very heavily dependent on Nvidia chips in order to train and run their models. In fact, they became some of the biggest contributors to the CUDA ecosystem, which is Nvidia’s software ecosystem and platform.

They got very good at that, but at the same time with US export controls and greater technology restrictions on access to cutting-edge GPUs, China increasingly pushed these AI companies to switch away from Nvidia to Huawei and other domestic AI chip makers. The idea there is to develop a parallel domestic AI chip supply chain that is good enough, if not on par with, Nvidia’s latest chips, and — crucially — resilient to policy actions coming out of Washington.

So that is the story up until this point. The question is, now, what is that trajectory for the Chinese GPU or AI chip development?

The reason I wanted to start there is that the motivations to get close to Jensen Huang are very murky to me. As the CEO of Nvidia, I understand that everyone thinks he’s the character and he’s actually in the software designing the next generation of Nvidia GPUs, but he’s just traveling the world giving policy speeches.

If you want to build a parallel GPU ecosystem, you’re trying to get close to the designers and the engineers, right? What would be the goal of trying to get close to Jensen Huang?

If you wanted the design specs for the latest Nvidia GPUs, I don’t know if you would ask Jensen directly. I think you might want to go to his technical staff.

He does have like 60 direct reports. Decoder is often a show about org charts and that one has been on top of my list for a long time, but we’ll set that aside for now. Keep going.

What it’s really about is potentially two things. One is trying to understand, maybe to glean information about, the US policymaking process. Jensen Huang is very close to Trump. They talk a lot. Trump can apparently just call Jensen on his cell phone at any moment.

In the middle of a conference. We’ve seen the video.

On the other side, and maybe this is even the bigger issue, perhaps it’s the biggest concern of all, is the concern that the direction of movement could run the other way, which is that somehow through Jensen, China might be able to influence US policymaking, especially on export controls. That is the big worry from a lot of people in Washington.

One of the other underlying concerns here, that I’m just trying to parse out, is that Alice Huang, the alleged Chinese spy, is an executive at a company called Megaspeed. And through Megaspeed, Nvidia may have already been circumventing export controls.

It seems like if you’re already solving the problem, maybe you should just leave it alone. How does that dynamic play out?

A lot of the story is strange. Even seen in the most cynical terms, it doesn’t quite add up. There could be several different possibilities. One is that this is actually not some concerted strategy from Beijing to try to obtain chips or information or influence, but this is potentially Beijing not quite understanding the full situation and wanting to co-op this Alice Huang person and at least try to understand from her standpoint what is happening.

Because I think you’re right. Already you have a very strong relationship between Nvidia and Megaspeed. You also already have — and this is on the influence side — Jensen Huang advocating for his own commercial interests, for a loosening of export controls on his own chips to China. You don’t really need Beijing to push on that gas pedal. That’s already happening.

So there are some things that don’t quite make sense if you’re thinking about it from those standpoints, but if you’re thinking about it from the viewpoint of “Beijing wants visibility,” then perhaps that is another plausible explanation.

Beijing just wants someone who Trump calls on the phone to advocate for their viewpoints. I see all of that, but what are we getting out of it? If the goal is Nvidia chips, it feels like that is already assured. If the goal is Nvidia engineering plans, that feels like a question mark. If the goal is influence over the Trump administration, I feel like they could have just bought cryptocurrency.

[Laughs] That’s right.

There’s a big swirl of what is actually happening here. Maybe your point that Beijing just needed more visibility because it is a swirl is the motivating factor. The question that leads me to is that the New York Times reports that US intelligence agencies first flagged these issues a year ago to the Trump administration. There was a memo from Marco Rubio. The reporting is that he oversaw the memo, which is as much plausible deniability as anything. He oversaw it. He was aware that there was a memo. A year ago, the United States’ national security apparatus was worried about Alice Huang at Megaspeed, her relationship with Jensen, and nothing occurred. What do you make of that?

That is one of the most worrying aspects of all this. Regardless of what the details are and what is known publicly versus what our intelligence community knows, this is something that should be investigated. This is obviously a major national security issue and this is something where you don’t want someone meddling with this process. You want to do a full investigation, get to the bottom of what’s happening.

I think what we’re seeing from some of the reporting is that this has been known, and in fact, if anything, there may have been efforts to try to stop this investigation or distort it in some way. That is very troubling from that internal, within-the-US-government perspective.

There’s a lot going on with Nvidia in that part of the story, where Nvidia’s own spokespeople are saying, “There’s nothing going on here. This is a normal relationship,” on the record to many publications. A week later, Jensen issues his apology letter saying there was a relationship.

That’s not great for John Rizzo, Nvidia’s comms person. Tim Teter, Nvidia’s general counsel, is out there saying everything is above board. Now we know not everything is above board. What do you make of Nvidia’s corporate governance here? Because there’s a whole bunch of shareholder lawsuits to come. There’s one filed as of today. I can only imagine there are more to come.

Nvidia has to tread very carefully here because what you don’t want is exactly what’s already happening, which is to start to deny or dismiss some of these issues and then turn around and have to say, “Actually, there might be something there.”

This is especially important now as there are growing calls for a congressional investigation. So this is going to be separate, perhaps, from within the executive branch where, again, I think we have reasons to worry about conflicts of interest and people not wanting to do this all the way. But if there’s a full-blown congressional investigation, that might reveal some things that, if you are Nvidia, you want to get out in front of rather than have to backpedal later on and explain yourself.

Part of the back and forth here with the government’s concern about Alice Huang and Megaspeed is that the Commerce Department spent months looking at the company and then Teter, the general counsel of Nvidia, emailed them and invoked a direct relationship with the Commerce undersecretary, Jeff Kessler. That got the case kicked to the DOJ where everything stopped.

Trump yesterday said the FBI is investigating — that’s obviously connected to the DOJ. There’s a universe where the Trump administration is trying to make this go away. Nvidia can pressure the Trump administration to make this go away. That reeks of corruption, obviously.

And then you have a very empowered class of Democrats coming into Congress with polling that suggested corruption was one of the top issues in this last election. I don’t see any outcome except those Democrats and an empowered bunch of investigators and an empowered bunch of committee chairs coming after Nvidia as hard as they can.

How should the company think about that? Should they just fire Jensen now to get away from it? Should they put them in front of Congress every day for the next year? How do you think that’s going to play out?

I think, at the most fundamental level, they need to cooperate and comply with calls from Congress to carry out this full investigation. Because up until now, this has all been so murky, and part of the reason why this has been a stop-and-go, even though those of us in the China AI space have been hearing about this for a while.

Companies like Megaspeed, their role in all this, even people like Alice Huang, have been flagged much earlier than this. The fact that this is coming out now, but also that the investigation was stopped and started within the Trump administration, is a big red flag. Ultimately, from Nvidia’s standpoint, they’re going to have to come clean with whatever Congress now requests. There are going to be a lot of hard questions from Congress, as there should be, that have been building up for some time now.

If you ever looked at Jensen’s approach to chip export controls, he’s been very fiery that chip export controls are stupid. You mentioned earlier that’s in his business interest. It is better for the Chinese AI industry to be dependent on CUDA and dependent on Nvidia chips, because then if we do get into some conflict, maybe you can restrict that access and you’ll set them back. There’s some swirl of argument that he makes that says it’s in the United States’ national security interest to ship as many Nvidia GPUs to China as you can.

Then there are a lot of China hawks who are saying, “Actually, you need to restrain them and keep them years behind. They will not catch up to our bleeding-edge technology. Jensen, you just keep us ahead.” It feels like, out of all of this, the China hawks are going to start winning more fights than they’re losing — arguing that the Chinese government is actively trying to impede our efforts or actively trying to influence our government.

How should people think about that? What framework should we use to evaluate that mass of differing opinions, especially now that there’s a catalyst for some kind of change?

I think that’s the right way to frame up this whole debate. You have, on the one hand, folks who see the US-China AI competition as a critical strategic competition and access to compute is one of the key levers there, and thus US export controls, not only as they stand now, but tightening them further will be critical to maintaining US edge in the most powerful technology of our lives.

Then there are other people who are in the opposite camp who advocate for greater exports of the US AI tech stack writ large, including Nvidia chips and including to China. Up until now, that camp has been led by people like [Commerce Secretary] Howard Lutnick, Jensen Huang, and Trump himself. What’s interesting is the balance of power, in terms of whose arguing gets more weight, has been shifting and will shift in light of this recent controversy.

So here now those who have been advocating for more exports and fewer export controls, some of their arguments have been tainted by this process potentially, regardless of where the investigation goes.

Then there’s a final variable in all this, which is China itself. That’s something that matters a lot in this discussion because in the background, China is doing two things. One, they’re trying to build their own chips and they’re sort of all-in on building a resilient semiconductor supply chain with their own, say, Huawei AI chips that their own AI companies can use. They will never really catch up. It looks highly unlikely, but they could develop good enough chips to replace the Nvidia ones that they have been dependent on for so long.

The second big factor from China is retaliation. And this is one thing that I’m watching very closely. If these greater export controls are placed by the US on not just chips to China, but also on chip-making equipment — the tools required to make the semiconductors themselves — will China use its own export controls, such as restricting rare earth metals, to hit back?

Right. This is in the context of an ongoing trade and tariff war that has rocked the United States’ economy. In many ways, the first thing that Democrats should do when they enter the next Congress is pass a law getting rid of all the Trump tariffs, right? They’re brought into Congress to fix affordability and the tariffs are an affordability problem, and now we’re going to rush into a trade war with China because we might ask the Dutch government to restrict ASML chip making machines.

That seems very fraught to say, “We need to enter into an even more heated AI war with China that might result in the Chinese government placing export controls on the goods that you already find unaffordable.” Do you think that there’s the political will to go through this whole exercise, or is it just to punish Nvidia and Jensen Huang?

In some ways, this is happening against the backdrop of other issues that are probably more top of mind for both voters and for incoming legislators in the Capitol. Things like cost of living, as you point out, tariffs, and trying to investigate the Trump administration more broadly for corruption and other issues. Somewhere in there is also the debate around data centers and AI itself.

So in some ways, I’ll be curious to see how far this goes, the particular Nvidia issue. There is a scenario where a congressional investigation comes and goes, potentially finds no wrongdoing on Jensen Huang’s part, and then this is just folded into the longer debate around export controls. But there’s another world where if there are issues that come up, that could be potentially disruptive, not just for Nvidia and not just for the US-China relationship, but also for the AI boom in the US overall.

Tell me more about China itself. You mentioned that their chips will maybe get good enough. There’s an argument that the models right now, the frontier models we have today, are actually good enough to disrupt the economy. They’re certainly good enough to disrupt the field of mathematics.

You could stop training new models and just let the technology diffuse and you would still disrupt huge swaths of the economy today. We’re nowhere close to that actually happening. I think the AI labs should prove that they can do it with the technology they have today. That’s for another time.

But China doesn’t need to compete at the frontier to gain the productivity advantages and to gain the industrial advantages. The example I keep using is 5G. I was told for a decade that we had to win the race to 5G, otherwise China would do something and no one would ever tell me what the “something” was.

What is the “something” with AI that China will defeat us at that has made this such a critical geopolitical chess match? And is there a point where it will just be good enough for them to achieve that “something”?

The funny thing is that China doesn’t see this AI race as being so much about the frontier per se. They’re really much more focused on diffusing the technology. And they think they can “win” the AI race by just having AI used much more broadly and integrated throughout the economy, especially in areas like manufacturing where they are already the behemoth.

I think when they see the discussion around getting to AGI, certainly from the government standpoint in Beijing, that to them looks like a bubble and a waste of money. Why are you building all that compute for that? What’s interesting to see is the strategy as they’ve been playing it out is one where they’re trying to not fall too far behind the US, but really focus a lot more on trying to get — especially these open source models — out there across the Chinese economy and globally as well. To that extent, on that metric, they seem to be doing well.

That, to me, always has seemed like the real fight. Anthropic and OpenAI are furious that the Chinese companies are constantly distilling their models. They’re trying to build some technology to keep them from distilling their models.

But if you believe in the promise of AI and what it can do to the economy, your emphasis should be on diffusing good enough models, not AGI. Whereas our emphasis due to the way our market works is a bunch of guys who think they’re going to build digital Jesus. Whatever is going to happen, that’s the thing they want. [Anthropic CEO] Dario Amodei has to pretend that he cares about Salesforce, but we know what his real priority is.

How do the United States and China compete in that dynamic, where you have one very managed economy that has set a much more near-term and potentially achievable goal, and then our market system where the incentives of the leading market players have nothing to do with the economic incentives of the rest of us?

There’s even an ideological foundation to all of this because the vision of AGI is one that is so deeply embedded right now in the American AI community and Silicon Valley culture that I think there’s a risk of potential disconnect, not just between the US and China on this issue, but also within the US, between those who are in the labs like Anthropic and those who are outside who are saying, “Why are we building these giant metal boxes in our backyards? We don’t really see the point of this.”

So there’s already that divergence there. Part of it is this longstanding obsession in the American AI imagination with getting to the machine god essentially.

Bringing that all back to the context of Nvidia, Jensen Huang, Alice Huang, and Megaspeed. Megaspeed is a data center provider in Southeast Asia. It’s theoretically their business. They’re building data centers, they’re buying these chips. Shouldn’t market forces just end this?

The United States AI companies want to build data centers. They will pay whatever rates because they have an ideological purpose that is disconnected from capitalism potentially. The Chinese government is just trying to diffuse AI into manufacturing and the United States government would like to hold them back.

Shouldn’t market forces just mean that you sell the chips to the highest bidder and the highest bidder will almost always be an American AI company?

That’s an interesting question, because there is ultimately market demand in China still for these Nvidia chips. And there’s a divergence here between the companies in China who still want access to Nvidia chips and the government who is saying, “No, no, no. Why don’t you try Chinese chips? Why don’t you help us with our Chinese domestic chip development?”

There’s that divergence there. What’s interesting is players like Megaspeed in between could potentially do things like not just allow Chinese AI companies, again, to potentially get access to Nvidia chips, but then the argument some people are making is that those are chips that could have gone to the US AI companies and hyperscalers who are desperate.

That is an argument that’s out there, but fundamentally, I don’t know how much of this is driven by those sheer commercial interests alone or, again, by some of these policy or ideological divides.

Or by the influence of an alleged spy.

Right, exactly.

Because in a pure market environment, I think I know how this goes, but then you obviously have the complicated geopolitical dynamics and then you have this corruption element where both governments are attempting to influence one company at the center of the storm.

What do you think happens if the Nvidia board investigation determines that Jensen acted inappropriately or a shareholder lawsuit imposes massive liability on Nvidia or a congressional investigation?

There’s no way this company comes out of this unscathed, and the options are Jensen steps down or Nvidia’s restrained in some way or export controls go up even higher. Walk us through the probabilities and what you think happens next.

There is a scenario actually where this ends up with not that much happening.

Interesting.

There is a pathway where there is a congressional investigation and they possibly find no wrongdoing or maybe Jensen really didn’t know, as he claims, that this Alice Huang person was a Chinese spy, and that this ends up feeding into the longer standing trajectory of all the export control debates and everything like that. That’s one possibility.

Another possibility, though, is if there is some kind of wrongdoing that’s found, Jensen Huang might have to step down as CEO. He’s not just like a central node, he is like American AI, like the pillar that is holy.

He’s the only one making the dollar. I mean, this is very important.

Yeah, it’s like if you could draw the network diagram of the entire US AI ecosystem, Nvidia would be at the center of that. If you could draw the diagram of the entire Nvidia ecosystem, a single man is standing at the heart of all of that.

The question becomes, if he were no longer the CEO of Nvidia, how much impact would that have on Nvidia’s ability to make progress on its own AI chips and what impact would that have on the rest of the US AI industry? One possibility, for example, is that there is a slowdown in Nvidia’s ability to crank out next generation after next generation of better and better chips. And that could impact US overall compute build out. That is one possibility.

Another possibility is that there’s just so much demand and that the knowledge is diffused enough throughout Nvidia that the company can still continue to make progress at a breakneck pace even without their fearless leader at the top. A lot is unknown.

“Fearless” is the right word, because when I look at Nvidia, again, I don’t think Jensen is designing the chips. I know that there’s a character he wants to play, where he’s in all the meetings and he’s probably taking some risk in chip design that is hard for us to see from the outside.

But what we can see is Jensen’s enormous appetite for risk when it comes to financing neoclouds and investing in frontier AI companies. All of the dollars Nvidia is making flow back out in a circle to the AI ecosystem. It’s unclear to me whether that continues to happen without Jensen specifically being willing to front the risk and show up on CNBC as the face of the risk and say, “Everything’s okay.” What do you think happens then?

His role as not just a technology leader, but as a market maker is really crucial. When he calls out certain companies like certain startups or neoclouds, you can see their stock prices go up. When he says something like, “I don’t know if this quantum thing is going to work out,” you saw the entire industry takes a hit. So that is the weight of his role in the broader ecosystem.

Going forward, without that kind of advocate and this market maker playing this active role, that’s another factor. Beyond the Nvidia chips themselves and the technological role of the company, there is this deeper industry or even sociological function that Jensen plays and that Nvidia plays in this broader AI buildout.

One of the interesting dynamics in all of that is Jensen also doesn’t seem to care very much about AGI. He thinks it’s just software. I’ve heard him say, “This is just software. Everybody calm down. These risks are fake. We don’t need a safety regime, all this stuff.” He’s more aligned with what you’re describing as the Chinese viewpoint, where this is just a tool to accelerate our economy. If he goes, maybe that changes too.

It’s possible. He has been one of the most powerful counterweights to the “let’s go all in on AGI” perspective that you hear from Dario Amodei and Sam Altman, for example. Without his voice in that process, he’s also been a very strong advocate for open source. Again, emphasizing the diffusion rather than the, say, control and restrictions on cutting-edge AI.

I do think if his voice is not there, there would be a pretty big vacuum for folks who would advocate that position or that view. At the same time though, again, beyond the immediate AI industry in the US, I don’t know how much that “race to AGI” argument resonates with the broader US public.

Right now a lot of people are just more wondering about the nuts and bolts of it. Is this technology going to cost me my job tomorrow? Is it actually useful? Is it impacting my university studies? Those are things that maybe are more impactful day-to-day for most ordinary Americans.

It is abundantly clear that Jensen is not a great spokesperson to the average consumer in the United States. He has not made the sale to them. He’s made the sale to a bunch of financiers. He’s made the sale to Wall Street. He’s made the sale to the tech industry.

But the average American, as we can just see from the polling in the election, is very, very skeptical of all of this and very, very skeptical of the costs versus the benefits. Again, I’m just putting that in the context of there’s an alleged Chinese spy whispering in the ear of this man.

What truly would the Chinese government hope to gain from that? Because in one way, they’ve actually achieved a victory here. They’ve destabilized the American AI economy. But it doesn’t seem like that was the goal. They’re furiously denying that any of this even happened.

There is another very counterintuitive take, which is they kind of shot themselves in the foot on this one. From Beijing’s perspective, they don’t want to see more export controls, they might want to see a loosening. But now because of this potential Chinese spy, they’ve tainted the one man who has been advocating the most for loosening export controls. In some ways now, they’ve taken out someone who had otherwise for sheer commercial reasons been more aligned, and who’s going to take that place?

If anything now, it has really charged the Democrats especially, who have been criticizing the Trump administration about not being tougher on these export controls. It has really galvanized the Democrats on this front and made it more of an issue perhaps than it was before.

Yeah, especially when you connect it to corruption and the AI industry wasting money, all this stuff, it’s all there for them. Tell me more broadly about Chinese spying in the AI industry.

There was a report, I don’t know, a few months ago that OpenAI was warning its employees that spies abound, that if suddenly attractive people appeared, be wary because they were probably spies. I love that. There’s just something about that that’s great.

Obviously when it hits Jensen, it’s a different kind of story, especially with the national security implications and corruption implications. Give us a sense of what the spy trade is like on the ground for the average AI researcher.

All I can say here is that they are juicy targets. For the US AI labs, anyone who’s involved with cutting-edge frontier AI, chip production, and chip design would be juicy targets for Chinese intelligence gathering because this is something where China’s trying to catch up. They’re trying to figure out how to keep pace with the US on AI and try to build their own alternatives to Nvidia GPUs.

You can see there have been other examples of cases where they’ve been poaching engineers from TSMC in Taiwan or from South Korea, and have struggled to deal with efforts to hold back this strategic IP basically. There’s probably a lot more happening under the surface in terms of this cat-and-mouse game, but I do think that they are prime targets.

Correct me if I’m wrong, but I think that there have been warnings from the US government to be careful and to step up your game on the cybersecurity front and the intelligence front to protect against these threats.

Meanwhile, they’re putting all their information into Slack and getting breached on the daily. Who knows if these warnings are taking off.

Onto the last set of questions here — I’m thinking about Apple and Tesla, where we moved our manufacturing to China and we moved our supply chains to China, the Chinese industries.

Whether it was above board or not — and there’s a rich debate you could have on that, we’ve had it on the show — they learned a lot from our companies. There was technology transfer. That’s happening in AI too.

There are a lot of Chinese AI researchers working in and around these labs. There is technology transfer happening, again, above board or not. Isn’t that just the normal course of business or is there something more nefarious happening here?

To some extent there are people flows and knowledge flows. You might not even think of it in terms of national-level AI communities. You might think about this global diffusion of know-how tips and tricks for squeezing a bit more performance out of the same amount of compute. Especially up until recently, you saw a lot of sharing of, say, papers like the transformer paper, that disseminated new architectural breakthroughs throughout the global AI community. And now that’s changing, obviously, as a lot of companies, especially the US companies, are holding this much closer to their chest.

But there is this broader question about who gets access to this. Who gains and loses? I guess it’s also not just a one-way flow. Some of these American AI companies benefit a lot from having some of these Chinese developers work with them. In the same way Apple and Tesla, it wasn’t just like they gave away the crown jewels to China, but that China in turn saved these companies, especially at times when they were facing a perilous moment in their histories.

There’s this bigger question about what the line is between normal commercial and technology flows versus a concerted state-backed effort to obtain sensitive strategic secrets and IP technology that would have broader geopolitical implications.

Does that strategy for China look like a bunch of companies like Megaspeed with allegedly compromised executives, or does it play out more directly?

Actually if anything, it would be less about the companies like Megaspeed, who seem to be middlemen for dealing with compute, and perhaps different companies, different agencies perhaps in the Chinese system, that might be more active.

At one extreme you have the outright concerted efforts at industrial espionage. They’re state-backed actors who are very systematic at trying to obtain some of the best commercial secrets from around the world, including from American companies.

But on the other hand, you do also have this gray zone of, “If a Chinese company acquires a stake in a US or European company, what does that mean? Does that mean they’re trying to obtain the technology or is that a regular commercial deal?” That’s where it starts to get more difficult to parse and you’d have to look at it on a case-by-case basis.

One of the dynamics in talking about the Chinese government and the United States, especially when you talk to American industrialists, is that the American government is chaos and democracy is messy and everyone’s running in 50 different directions, and the Chinese system is directed. They make 100-year plans, not one-quarter plans. We’ve heard it. Everyone knows these cliches.

How true is that? In this case alone, it doesn’t seem like they achieved the goal of their plan. In many cases, they might have actually set themselves back.

Oh, yeah. For those who actually study China, who have done long-term research on this country and who understand it more closely, it looks like a much messier picture than any of these portrayals, especially from those in Silicon Valley who try to juxtapose China against what they find to be this annoyingly messy and unruly democracy.

The Chinese system, both within the government and then across industries and government, is full of conflicting interests, rife with corruption. There are lots of times where you have bureaucratic turf wars that spill out into the open. You have missteps, ones that can backfire profoundly.

You see that all the time. You see the local governments not following what Beijing wants, or following what Beijing wants but in the wrong direction. Sometimes they’re given a signal and they say, “Oh, okay, we got to run that way.” And then Beijing says, “No, no, no, no, no, other way, other way.”

This happens all the time, and to anyone in Silicon Valley who’s trying to make this “neat” argument, all I can say is, go talk to people in China. They can tell you how messy it actually is on the ground.

Kyle, this has been great. What do you think will happen next year? What should people be looking out for?

The biggest thing is a congressional investigation and who’s behind that, what that surface is. And then potentially along with that, these pending bills around export controls and whether those will now get more momentum to pass in Congress, and whether Trump himself, and the White House in general, will try to play a role in either stopping that or giving that a quiet green light.

I suspect we’re going to want to talk to you again as this process plays out. Thank you so much, Kyle, for being on Decoder****.

Thank you.

Questions or comments? Hit us up at decoder@theverge.com. We really do read every email!

Decoder with Nilay Patel

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事件综述

黄仁勋承认婚外情后辞任 Nvidia CEO,多方启动调查

2026 年 11 月 10 日,TechCrunch 报道 Nvidia CEO 黄仁勋公开承认对结婚 40 年的妻子不忠,并将此事与新闻报道引发的国家安全担忧相关联;Nvidia 董事会随即启动独立调查。美国官员指称其交往对象、Megaspeed 高管 Alice Huang 为中国情报部门服务并回传信息(后续 The Verge 报道中,美国情报界的说法为其“可能为”中方情报人员)。Megaspeed 两年内采购了 48 亿美元 Nvidia 芯片,其关联的上海世纪立通据 The Information 报道促成 75 亿美元芯片购买,其中包括被禁售芯片。三名共和党委员会主席要求黄仁勋闭门汇报,股价次日下跌超 5%,Trump 表示支持黄仁勋留任,黄仁勋则退出了 ElevenLabs Summit 和 Anthropic CEO Forum 的演讲。11 月 12 日,The Verge 报道黄仁勋因丑闻辞任 Nvidia CEO;同日 TechCrunch 报道民主党众议员 Richard Neal 与参议员 Ron Wyden 发起调查,要求商务部保存有关 Nvidia 对华芯片销售安排的记录,信中质疑 H200 出口协议、15% 对华销售分成安排、商务部在情报机构提醒后仍允许新加坡 Megaspeed 采购芯片,以及 Nvidia 向特朗普项目捐赠 2600 万美元等因素。黄仁勋已同意出席共和党主导的委员会闭门作证。The Verge 的访谈中还提到 Megaspeed 可能在马来西亚建数据中心、成为中国 AI 公司获取 Blackwell 等芯片的渠道,并指出国会调查和股东诉讼可能冲击 Nvidia 及美国 AI 生态。

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